Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study
Swee-Hoon Chuah (),
Robert Hoffmann () and
Chew Ging Lee ()
Occasional Papers from Industrial Economics Division
This paper presents experimental evidence demonstrating that agents' knowledge of strategy alternatives in pure coordination games is inversely correlated with decision-making efficacy. Alternative theoretical accounts of players' choice processes in coordination games are considered to shed light on our empirical results.
Keywords: coordination; incomplete information; salience; curse of knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Working Paper: Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nub:occpap:7
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