The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses

Ken Binmore and Paul Klemperer
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Ken Binmore: Dept of Economics, University College London

No 2002-W4, Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22 1/2 billion ($34 billion or 2 1/2% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus "beauty contests", the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.

Keywords: Auctions; Telecommunications; Spectrum Auctions; Mobile Phones; 3G; UMTS; Bidding. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2001-02-01, Revised 2001-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences (2002)
Working Paper: The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:0204

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