Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining

Christopher Tyson

No 2004-W23, Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. These conditions serve to preclude embedded static bargaining problems of the sort that have historically been deemed indeterminate, thereby ensuring that the dynamic problems analyzed will be resolvable without imposing any particular static theory.

Keywords: coalition; core; iterative dominance; temporal monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004-08-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2004/w23/270804.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:0423

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maxine Collett (maxine.collett@nuffield.ox.ac.uk).