A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Aytek Erdil () and Paul Klemperer
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Aytek Erdil: Dept of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford

No 2009-W11, Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, “Reference Rules,” to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost riskless, profitable deviations from “truthful bidding” are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.

Keywords: multi-object auction; core; combinatorial auction; package auction; core-selecting auction; Vickrey auction; Vickrey; simultaneous ascending auction; robust design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2009-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions (2010)
Working Paper: A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:0911

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