Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Leonardo Felli and Kevin Roberts

Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when marching is assortative and sellers' investment precede market competition the investments are constrained efficient.

Keywords: COMPETITION; MARKET STRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? (2016)
Working Paper: Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? (2011)
Working Paper: Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? (2002)
Working Paper: Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? (2001)
Working Paper: Does competition solve the hold-up problem? (2001)
Working Paper: Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem? (2000)
Working Paper: Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? (2000)
Working Paper: Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?
Working Paper: Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-w11

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