Instant Exit from the War of Attrition

David Myatt

Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: This paper takes a new look at the classic concession game. It argues that exit from an asymmetric war of attrition is likely to be instant. Selecting a unique equilibrium using a "craziness" pertubation device, it finds a notion of stochastic strength determines the outcome, with a stochastically weaker player giving up immediately.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:9922

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