Discussion Papers

From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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1582: Anticipations and Endogenous Present Bias

Simone Galperti and Bruno Strulovici

1581: On the Design of Criminal Trials: The Benefits of a Three-Verdict System

Ron Siegel and Bruno Strulovici

1580: Private Politics and Public Regulation

Georgy Egorov and Bard Harstad

1579: Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes

Daniel Garrett and Alessandro Pavan

1578: Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination

Renato Gomes and Alessandro Pavan

1577: Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice

Renato Gomes, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur and Alessandro Pavan

1576: Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall

Alessandro Pavan

1575: Explicit Renegotiation in Repeated Games

Mikhail Safronov and Bruno Strulovici

1574: Whether or not to open Pandora's box

Laura Doval

1573: Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naiveté

Aviad Heifetz and Willemien Kets

1572: Achieving Cooperation under Privacy Concerns

Wioletta Dziuda and Ronen Gradwohl

1571: The Logical Consistency of Time Inconsistency: A Theory of Forward-Looking Behavior

Simone Galperti and Bruno Strulovici

1570: Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria

George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan

1569: Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information

Willemien Kets

1568r: Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information

Bruno Jullien and Alessandro Pavan

1568: Platform Competition under Dispersed Information

Bruno Jullien and Alessandro Pavan

1567: Hidden Actions and Preferences for Timing of Resolution of Uncertainty

Haluk Ergin and Todd Sarver

1566: Optimal Reference Points and Anticipation

Todd Sarver

1565: Eliciting Beliefs by Paying in Chance

Alvaro Sandroni and Eran Shmaya

1564: Tractable Falsifiability

Ronen Gradwohl and Eran Shmaya

1563: The Supermodular Stochastic Ordering

Margaret Meyer and Bruno Strulovici

1562: Compressed Equilibrium in Large Repeated Games of Incomplete Information

Ehud Kalai and Eran Shmaya

1561: Privacy in Implementation

Ronen Gradwohl

1560: The Roman Metro Problem: Dynamic Voting and the Limited Power of Commitment

Christian Roessler, Sandro Shelegia and Bruno Strulovici

1559: Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design

Renato Gomes and Alessandro Pavan

1558: Polarization and Ambiguity

Sandeep Baliga, Eran Hanany and Peter Klibanoff

1557: Ranking Friends

Yossi Feinberg and Willemien Kets

1556: Correlation of Types in Bayesian Games

Luciano De Castro

1555: Vigilant Measures of Risk and the Demand for Contingent Claims

Mario Ghossoub

1554: Information Acquisition and Welfare

Luca Colombo, Gianluca Femminis and Alessandro Pavan

1553: Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation

Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci

1552: Strategic Immunization and Group Structure

Andrea Galeotti and Brian Rogers

1551: Symmetric play in repeated allocation games

Christoph Kuzmics, Thomas Palfrey and Brian Rogers

1550: All Types Naive and Canny

Aviad Heifetz and Willemien Kets

1549: Price Distortions in High-Frequency Markets

Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart

1548: Auction Design with Fairness Concerns: Subsidies vs. Set-Asides

Mallesh Pai and Rakesh Vohra

1547: Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty

Willemien Kets

1546: Social Learning and Innovation Cycles (revision of DP#1516, The Dynamics of Innovation)

Umberto Garfagnini and Bruno Strulovici

1545: Dueling Algorithms

Nicole Immorlica

1544: The Economics of the Smart Grid

Luciano De Castro

1543: Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts

Martin Szydlowski

1542r: On the Smoothness of Value Functions

Bruno Strulovici and Martin Szydlowski

1541: Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals

Simone Galperti

1540: Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

Renato Gomes and Alessandro Pavan

1539: Quotient Spaces of Boundedly Rational Types

Davide Cianciaruso and Fabrizio Germano

1538: Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction

Bach Ha and Jason Hartline

1537: Calibration: Respice, Adspice, Prospice

Dean Foster and Rakesh Vohra

1536: Price Discrimination Through Communication

Itai Sher and Rakesh Vohra

1535: Ambiguity Aversion and Absence of Trade

Alain Chateauneuf and Luciano De Castro

1534: Core and Equilibria under ambiguity

Luciano De Castro, Marialaura Pesce and Nicolas Yannelis