Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games

Jeroen Swinkels (j-swinkels@kellogg.northwestern.edu)

No 1001, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models of experimentation and adjustment, and some simple learning dynamics. We present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens [1986]). This behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs.

Keywords: game theory; evolution; learning; adjustment dynamics; dynamics; dynamic stability; strategic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games (2010)
Journal Article: Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games (1993)
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