Custom Versus Fashion: Path-Dependence and Limit Cycles in a Random Matching Game

Kiminori Matsuyama

No 1030, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: A pairwise random matching game is considered to identify the social environments that give rise to the social custom and fashion cycles. The game, played by Conformists and Nonconformists, can generate a variety of socially stable behavior patterns. In the path-dependence case, Conformists set the social custom and Nonconformists revolt against it; what actin becomes the custom is determined by "history." In the limit cycle case, Nonconformists become fashion leaders and switch their actions periodically, while Conformists follow with delay. The outcome depends on the relative share of Conformists to Nonconformists as well as their matching patterns.

Keywords: Best response dynamics; Bifurcation; Conformity and nonconformity; Equilibrium refinement; Evolutionary process; Limit cycles; Path-dependence; Strategic complements and substitutes; The collective selection and trickle-down theories of fasion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Custom versus fashion: path-dependence and limit cycles in a random matching game (1993)
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