Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games

Roger Myerson

No 1102, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: A general class of games with population uncertainty is formulated to describe situations where the set of players is not common knowledge. Simplifying independent-actions and environmental-equilvalence conditions imply that the numbers of players of each type are independent Poisson random variables. Equilibria of such Poisson games are defined and proven to exist. Formulas for approximating the equilibria of large Poisson games are derived, and are applied to a voting game in which participation is costly. We review how the analysis of such voting games can become more complicated and unrealistic when the set of players is assumed to be known.

Date: 1994-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Population uncertainty and Poisson games (1998)
Working Paper: Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games (1994)
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