Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium In First Place Auctions and War of Attrition with Affiliated Values

Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico

No 1120, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a 2-bidder asymmetric first price auction with affiliated values. The techniques used to prove uniqueness are different from the ones used in analyses of private values environments. Moreover the proof of existence is constructive. For comparison purposes we also consider the war of attrition and show that there is a continuum of equilibria in that game.

Date: 1995-03
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