Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules

Salvador Barberà ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Matthew O. Jackson

No 1142, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but may treat individuals asymmetrically.

Date: 1995-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules (1997)
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