Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction

Roger Myerson

No 1155, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper surveys four game-theoretic models of politics, to offer an introduction to the analysis of political institutions. The first two models focus on electoral competition, to show how successful candidates' equilibrium strategies may differ under different electoral systems. The other two models probe the consequences of legislative bargaining under different constitutional structures.

Date: 1996-04
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