Disciplined Coalitions and Redistribution: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure on Legislative Bargaining

Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen

No 1171, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Date: 1996-10
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