Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions

Jeroen Swinkels ()

No 1173, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly for multiple units. None of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players' distributions over values or of their equilibrium play are made. Because of this, equilibria will typically involve inefficiency: objects may not end up in the hands of those who value them most. We show that, none the less, such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of players, and possibly the number of objects, grows large.

Keywords: Auctions; Discriminatory Auction; First Price Auction; Asymmetry; Efficiency; Asymptotic Efficiency; Large Auctions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-10
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