Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences

Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer ()

No 1195, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We analyze a model of a two-candidate election in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. Voters may costlessly choose to either vote for one of the candidates or abstain. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voter's private information. The model also provides an explanation for observed patterns of participation and partisanship.

Date: 1996-10
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