Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey

Atsushi Kajii and Stephen Morris

No 1197, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a "canonical" way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple "complete theory" interpretation (Kreps 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the "higher order beliefs literature" (Rubinstein 1989; Monderer and Samet 1989; Morris, Rob and Shin, 1995; Kajii and Morris 1995) and the "payoff uncertainty approach" (Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg 1990).

Date: 1997-10
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