Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach

Alvaro Sandroni

No 1200, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: Two long lived players play a repeated coordination game. Players do not specify a single (and correct) probability to each event. They have a vague notion about the evolution of the play, called blurry beliefs, which guide their behavior. General conditions that ensure cooperation are investigated. Key words: Repeated Games, Learning, Cooperation, Bounded Rationality, Equilibrium Selection.

JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
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