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Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games

Roger Myerson

No 1214, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: Scoring rules are compared by the equilibria that they generate for simple elections with three candidates and voters drawn from large Poisson distributions. A calculus for comparing pivot probabilities in Poisson voting games is applied. For a symmetric Condorcet cycle, nonsymmetric discriminatory equilibria exist under best-rewarding scoring rules like plurality voting. A candidate who is universally disliked may still not be out of contention under worst-punishing scoring rules like negative-plurality voting. In elections where two of three candidates have the same position, symmetric equilibria coincide with majority rule only for scoring rules that are balanced between best-rewarding and worst-punishing. When voters also care about continuous functions of vote shares, equilibria may still depend on pivot probabilites.

Date: 1998-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games (2000) Downloads
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