Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers

Jinpeng Ma ()

No 1230, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper studies the job matching market in Kelso and Crawford(1982) with one exception that co-workers may generate utility or disutility in the workplace. We provide a simple idea to show how a great number of sufficient condiions for a nonempty core in the literature can be extended to this labor market. We also provide a deterministic and a stochatic recursive dynamic system each of which converges to an efficient core outcome as long as the core is nonempty.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers (2001)
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