Auctions with Downstream Interaction

Philippe Jehiel (philippe.jehiel@psemail.eu) and Benny Moldovanu (mold@uni-bonn.de)

No 1243, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We study auctions for an indivisble object. The outcome of the auction influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a funciton of the agents' valuations. While agent's i valuation is private information to i, other valuations are not observable by i at the time of the auction. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies for second price auctions in which the seller may impose reserve prices or entry fees, and we point out differences between the cases where impacts (which we call externalities) are positive or negative. Finally, we study the effect of reserve prices and entry fees on the seller's revenue.

Date: 1998-10
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1243.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1243

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
fwalker@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fran Walker (fwalker@kellogg.northwestern.edu this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).