Equilibrium Existence in Incomplete Information Games with Atomic Posteriors

Nabil Al-Najjar and Eilon Solan ()

No 1262, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We prove an existence result for games with incomplete information with continuous type spaces under the assumption that players have atomic posteriors. This information structure is an extreme example of the failure of absolute continuity of information, hence our result complements the classical result of Milgrom and Weber (1985).

Date: 1999-05
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