A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma

Jeffrey Ely and Juuso Välimäki

No 1264, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata.

Date: 1999-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma (2002)
Working Paper: A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma (2000)
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