Strategic Polarization

Adam Kalai and Ehud Kalai

No 1266, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: In joint decision making, people with common goals and similar preferences often take drastically opposing positions. In some cases, arbitrarily small discrepancies in preferences result in arbitrarily large losses in utility for all participants. An understanding of the properties of polarization may help game players and mechanism designers avoid its pitfalls.

Date: 1999-07
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