Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

First:Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz and Rakesh Vohra

No 1448, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly in¯nite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequence

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2009)
Working Paper: Characterization of revenue equivalence (2008)
Working Paper: Characterization of revenue equivalence (2007)
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