Information Independence and Common Knowledge

Olivier Gossner, Ehud Kalai and Robert Weber

No 1453, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: Conditions of information independence are important in information economics and game theory. We present notions of partial independence in Bayesian environments, and study their relationships to notions of common knowledge.

Keywords: Bayesian games; independent types; common knowledgees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-knm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Independence and Common Knowledge (2009)
Working Paper: Information Independence and Common Knowledge (2009)
Working Paper: Information Independence and Common Knowledge (2009)
Working Paper: Information Independence and Common Knowledge (2009)
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