Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power

Pohan Fong

No 1465, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would form and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status quo thus affects both the election outcomes and the bargaining power of the parties during government formation. A formateur party thus has incentives to strategically position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the subsequent bargaining over government formation and policy choice. These incentives can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto set of the parties.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; proposal power; reconsideration; evolving default; distributive politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power (2009)
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