Influential Opinion Leaders

Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart

No 1485, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though voters know the distribution of expert interests and account for it when evaluating endorsements. Expert influence is fully decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winning candidate and when experts are much better informed about the state of the world than are voters.

Keywords: election; manipulation; global game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Influential Opinion Leaders (2014)
Working Paper: Influential Opinion Leaders (2012)
Working Paper: Influential Opinion Leaders (2010)
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