Reputation in Long-Run Relationships

Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci ()

Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2’s type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2’s uncertainty about his type to secure his highest payoff in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.

Keywords: Repeated Games; Reputation; Equal Discount Factor; Long-run Players. JEL Classification Numbers: C73; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reputation in Long-Run Relationships (2012)
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