Compressed Equilibrium in Large Repeated Games of Incomplete Information

Ehud Kalai and Eran Shmaya

Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of Bayesian repeated large anonymous games. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C72

Keywords: Nash Anonymous games; Nash equilibrium; Repeated games; Large games; Bayesian equilibrium; Price taking; Rational expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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