Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Steven Matthews (),
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara () and
Andrew Postlewaite ()
No 892R, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on he concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.
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Journal Article: Refining cheap-talk equilibria (1991)
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