On Renegotiation-Proof Contracts in Repeated Agency

Rui Zhao

Discussion Papers from University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper I study ``renegotiation-proof" contracts in infinite-horizon principal-agent environment. A concept of renegotiation-proofness is adopted, which not only has the appeal of intuitively generalizing its counterpart in finite-horizon environment but proves to be a powerful device for characterizing the allocations that satisfy the notion. It is shown that renegotiation-proof contracts exist under broad conditions and admit simple characterizations.

Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.albany.edu/economics/research/workingp/2001/renegotiation_zhao.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.albany.edu/economics/research/workingp/2001/renegotiation_zhao.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.albany.edu/economics/research/workingp/2001/renegotiation_zhao.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nya:albaec:01-06

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Department of Economics, Building 25, Room 103 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A.
http://www.albany.ed ... workingp/index.shtml

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Building 25, Room 103 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Byoung Park ().