Manipulation of the Walrasian Mechanism in Production Economies with Short-Selling
Laurence Kranich ()
Discussion Papers from University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics
Hurwicz and Otani and Sicilian characterized the Nash equilibrium allocations of the Walrasian demand manipulation game in successively more general exchange environments. In this paper, we extend the analysis to production economies with short-selling. First, we generalize Hurwicz's and Otani and Sicilian's theorem that any allocation at which each agent's consumption bundle lies above her true offer curve can be supported in Nash equilibrium. We then show that for all finite economies the set of such allocations is large in that it contains an open subset of the feasible set.
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