Strategic Substitutes and Potential Games

Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko () and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

No 02-02, Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that games of strategic substitutes (or complements) with aggregation are "pseudo-potential" games, and therefore possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.

JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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