Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints

Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo

No 05-13, Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study simultaneous ascending auctions of identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, and characterize noncollusive equilibria. The equilibria exhibit the exposure problem. The bidder with the highest budget is more reluctant to bid, because the bidder with the lowest budget may end up pursuing only one object, thus preventing the realization of complementarities. In some states of the world both objects are assigned to the poorer bidder although that bidder has a lower valuation. Classification number-JEL: D44,H.

Keywords: Multiple-Object Auctions; Budget Constraints; Complementarities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2005/budcomp.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:05-13

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