Bargaining in Patent Licensing with Inefficient Outcomes

Yair Tauman (), Yoram Weiss and Chang Zhao

Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A monopoly incumbent faces an outside innovator who holds a new technology which has no industrial value to the monopolist but allows a protable entry. The monopolistis willing to pay for the IP of the technology more than any entrant, in an attempt to limit entry. Still, the innovator may sell a number of licenses before bargaining with the monopolist, even though this will reduce the bargaining cake. The sale of licenses will credibly increase the innovator's threat on the monopolist, as it increases the number of licenses the innovator will sell in case the bargaining fails.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/resear ... n_Weiss_Zhao2017.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:17-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().