Proportional Systems with Free Entry. A Citizen-Candidate Model
Paolo Balduzzi () and
Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics
We analyze the equilibrium of a proportional electoral system with free entry in a citizen candidate model. In proportional systems the policy outcomes are typically decided through legislative bargaining and a perspective entrant has to worry about the governing coalitions that will be able to reach 50% of the seats. We show that there are equilibria with medium-sized parties, i.e. no party has absolute majority but the number of parties is relatively small. However, when the number of seats is suÂ±ciently large, all equilibria must have at least 4 parties. We also discuss the impact of variations of the electoral formula, such as the introduction of of thresholds.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/resear ... roportional_1901.pdf (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:19-01
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().