Equitable Solutions in Game Representations: An Extension of the Shapley Value

Pradeep Dubey

Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus provides as an alternative justication of the value. Game representations also open the door for extending the Shapley value to situations where not all coalitions can form, provided those that can constitute a quasi-algebra; or, more generally, a hierarchy; or, still more generally, have full span.

Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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