Fiscal rules for sub-central governments: Design and impact

Douglas Sutherland, Robert Price and Isabelle Joumard
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Robert Price: OECD

No 1, OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism from OECD Publishing

Abstract: Against a background of mounting demands for spending on services provided by sub-central governments, this paper examines how fiscal rules can help to ensure that pressure on resources is minimised and available resources are used efficiently. Drawing on questionnaire responses and other sources, this paper gives a detailed picture of fiscal rules for sub-central governments in place among a number of OECD countries. The paper examines the rationales for using fiscal rules, the various impacts fiscal rules can have, the factors making for effective implementation and the interactions between the various types of rule. It then constructs a number of synthetic sub-indicators designed to assess the extent to which sub-central government fiscal frameworks exhibit favourable characteristics for the achievement of fiscal objectives. It concludes with the construction of a composite indicator based on the combined impacts in the different areas of fiscal policy.

Keywords: fiscal discipline; fiscal rules; indicators; Sub-central government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C43 D78 H71 H72 H74 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://doi.org/10.1787/3e6551ae-en (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fiscal Rules for Sub-central Governments: Design and Impact (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:ctpaab:01-en

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