Fiscal rules for subnational governments: The devil’s in the details

Camila Vammalle and Indre Bambalaite

No 35, OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism from OECD Publishing

Abstract: This paper describes and analyses the fiscal rules for subnational governments (SNGs) in OECD countries immediately prior to the COVID-19 crisis. It is based on information from the 2019 survey of fiscal rules for SNGs by the OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government. The paper analyses the details of the application of these SNG fiscal rules, and shows that the effective stringency of statutorily similar rules may vary greatly.

Keywords: fiscal federalism; fiscal rules; intergovernmental fiscal relations; subnational governments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H72 H74 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:ctpaab:35-en

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