Information sharing in competition policy

Oecd

No 335, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: Competition rules governing information sharing must balance two primary risks: permissive rules may facilitate tacit collusion or explicit cartel conduct, while overly restrictive frameworks can chill legitimate collaboration and create market inefficiencies. This paper reviews how different forms of information exchange affect firm incentives and market outcomes, drawing on recent economic literature. It also examines how competition authorities across OECD jurisdictions have approached the issue in practice, including through enforcement, case law and guidance. The paper aims to clarify the main factors that shape competitive risk and how those factors are reflected in current assessment and enforcement.

Keywords: antitrust; cartels; collusion; competition; information exchange; information sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D21 D43 D8 K21 L13 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1787/ecbf13e9-en (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:335-en

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().