Institutional investors and stewardship

Kenta Fukami, Daniel Blume and Carl Magnus Magnusson
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Kenta Fukami: OECD
Daniel Blume: OECD
Carl Magnus Magnusson: OECD

No 25, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: The sustained growth of institutional investors’ assets under management, together with the growing use of passive investment strategies, raises the question of whether existing frameworks adequately address issues related to investor engagement and disclosure. There has been a growth in the regulation of institutional investors and market intermediaries to address conflicts of interest and to enhance their transparency. In parallel, the adoption of stewardship codes and the number of signatories to such codes has been increasing. Their proliferation and to some extent convergence offers insights on recognised good practices. The paper also explores the apparent increase in engagement among institutional investors with respect to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, their increasing reliance on ESG ratings and data services, and whether regulatory frameworks or guidance should evolve to take into account these new developments.

Date: 2022-09-19
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaae:25-en

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