Behavioural insight and regulatory governance: Opportunities and challenges
James Drummond,
Daniel Shephard and
Daniel Trnka
Additional contact information
James Drummond: OECD
Daniel Shephard: Columbia University
Daniel Trnka: OECD
No 16, OECD Regulatory Policy Working Papers from OECD Publishing
Abstract:
Governments are created and run by humans, who can experience the same behavioural biases and barriers as individuals in society. Therefore, it makes sense to explore how behavioural insights (BI) can be applied to the governance of regulatory policy making, and not just to the design of regulations themselves. Applying BI can help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the decision-making process, which can, in turn, help improve regulatory decisions. This paper maps the ways in which barriers and biases can affect the institutions, processes and tools of regulatory governance, with a focus on regulatory oversight bodies and regulatory management tools. It concludes with practical ways governments can translate these findings into research and reforms that can help future-proof regulatory policy making and ensure it is agile, responsive and fit for tackling important and complex policy challenges.
Keywords: Behavioural economics; Behavioural insights; Regulation; Regulatory governance; Regulatory policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 D7 E03 F00 H11 K23 N40 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:govaah:16-en
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