Congestion Pricing with Minimal Public Opposition: The Use of High-occupancy Toll Lanes and Positive Incentives in Israel

Galit Cohen-Blankshtain, Hillel Bar-Gera and Yoram Shiftan
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Galit Cohen-Blankshtain: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Hillel Bar-Gera: Ben-Gurion University of the Negen
Yoram Shiftan: Technion, Israel Institute of Technology

No 2020/09, International Transport Forum Discussion Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: This paper reports on the Israeli experience with a high-occupancy toll (HOT) lane between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It highlights the integration of a park-and-ride service with the HOT lane and the provision of free parking to encourage carpooling. The paper also analyses Israel’s pilot “Going Green” programme and how it demonstrates the potential of positive incentives to address congestion.

Date: 2020-09-21
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:itfaab:2020/09-en

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