Communication via Third Parties

Jacopo Bizzotto, Eduardo Perez and Adrien Vigier
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Adrien Vigier: University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Working Papers from Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School

Abstract: We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard roblem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information with an eye to the continuation game, and incentivizing the agent to comply with the procedure designed. We provide a methodology to tackle such problems, and examine the way in which moral hazard affects the optimal procedure of the principal.

Keywords: Information Design; Moral Hazard; Agency Cost; Information Acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ore
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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530804 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Communication via Third Parties (2022)
Working Paper: Communication via Third Parties (2022)
Working Paper: Communication via Third Parties (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oml:wpaper:202006

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3530804

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