Procedural Fairness in Economic and Social Choice: Evidence from a Survey of Voters
No 27, Open Discussion Papers in Economics from The Open University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics
The paper argues for the relevance of procedural justice to social choice and presents supporting evidence from primary data on voter attitudes. A preliminary section proposes and discusses five propositions that indicate the potential value and significance of processes for social choice. Section 3 considers evidence for what psychologists have called 'voice' and the extent to which control over, or representation in, a decision is compatible with other economic notions of fair process, like random choosing. Section 4 examines empirical evidence that sensitivity to process fairness may be a means of dealing with power inequalities between interacting agents. Section 5 goes on to examine evidence concerning treatment which in some way is threatening to a person's position as an agent. A brief concluding section summarizes and indicates avenues for future research.
Keywords: procedural fairness; empirical social choice; random choosing; regard; cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D63 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
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Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 247-270, April
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Journal Article: Procedural fairness in economic and social choice: Evidence from a survey of voters (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:opn:wpaper:27
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