A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications

Christopher J. Ellis () and Anne van den Nouweland ()
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Christopher J. Ellis: University of Oregon Economics Department
Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon Economics Department

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly".

Keywords: Cooperation; Externalities; Spillovers; Efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2000-02-01, Revised 2000-02-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2000-2

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