Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria; An Investigation of Core Concepts

Mark Voorneveld and Anne van den Nouweland ()
Additional contact information
Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon Economics Department

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different criteria are not condensed by means of a utility function, but left in their own right. Moreover, the games considered are not single-valued, but each coalition can realize a set of vectors representing the outcomes of each of the criteria depending on several alternatives. Two core concepts are defined: the core and the dominance outcome core. The relation between the two concepts is studied and the core is axiomatized by means of consistency properties.

JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2001-06-01, Revised 2001-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2001-11_Voo ... ticriteria_Games.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria: An Investigation of Core Concepts (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2001-11

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bill Harbaugh ().