‘Guns and Butter’ in U.S. Presidential Elections

Stephen E. Haynes () and Joe Stone
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Stephen E. Haynes: Department of Economics, University of Oregon

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: Previous models of the popular vote in U.S. Presidential elections emphasize economic growth and price stability, the role of parties and incumbency, and pre-election expectations for the future. Despite an apparent statistical dead heat in the pre-election polls in 2004, formal models instead predict a landslide victory for President Bush. An obvious question is whether this anomaly arises, at least in part, from national security concerns – in particular, the conflict in Iraq. We attempt to resolve this pre-election anomaly by introducing two opposing electoral forces capturing national security concerns, which for the 2004 election reduces President Bush's predicted vote share. In general, the impact of national security concerns on the vote share of the incumbent (or the incumbent's party) may be positive, as in the 1944 election during World War II, or negative, as in the 1952 election during the Korean war and the 1968 election during the Vietnam war.

Keywords: presidential; elections; security; war; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2004-08-29, Revised 2004-09-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
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Journal Article: 'Guns and butter'' in U.S. presidential elections (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2004-12

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