Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate

Luisa Carpente, Balbina Casas-Mendez, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado and Anne van den Nouweland ()
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Luisa Carpente: Universidade da Coruna
Balbina Casas-Mendez: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Ignacio Garcia-Jurado: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.

Keywords: Strategic Games; Coalitional Interval Games; Superadditive Games; Axiomatic Characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2005-09-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-16

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